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UNMAS GAZA EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE REPORT
by Mark Frankish [ UNMAS Gaza ]
From 7 July to 26 August 2014, significant quantities of explosive ordnance were used during hostilities between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Gazan 
armed groups. It is reported that approximately 72,000 items 
of ordnance were fired and launched during this period.1 This 
presented a significant risk for civilians and hampered hu-
manitarian and reconstruction operations. Many unexplod-
ed aircraft bombs, tank projectiles, mortar shells and other 
munitions from both sides of the conflict were reported in 
civilian areas. Based on a 10 percent fail rate, it was assumed 
there are approximately 7,200 items of explosive remnants of 
war (ERW) in Gaza, including a significant number of air de-
livered bombs.2 The ERW contamination has interrupted the 
lives of entire communities in Gaza, where simply gaining 
access to homes, schools, health facilities, etc. 
is challenging and dangerous. Livelihoods 
are also directly affected when small indus-
tries and farmlands are destroyed and littered 
with ERW. 
The military operations resulted in over 
2,000 casualties in Gaza, 65 in Israel and 
massive damage to infrastructure and civil-
ian property in Gaza.3 A review on struc-
tures by United Nations Operational Satellite 
Applications Programme (UNOSAT) de-
tailed that within the 327 sq km (126 sq mi) 
of the Gaza strip, 6,761 structures were de-
stroyed, 3,565 were severely damaged and 
4,938 were moderately damaged. In addi-
tion, there were 7,473 craters recorded in ag-
ricultural and non-urbanized areas.4
Approximately 74 percent of the damage sustained was with-
in 3 km (1.8 mi) of the Armistice Line. Within this area multiple 
neighborhoods such as Shuja’iyya, Beit Hanoun, Khuza’a, etc., 
were damaged to such an extent that the vast majority of struc-
tures in these communities were completely destroyed.
Threat Defined 
While the majority of ERW seen to date in Gaza is of con-
ventional type, there have been no reports of submunitions 
or landmines used with the exception of anti-tank mines de-
ployed by combat engineers in the destruction of buildings. 
Ground ordnance in the form of tank, artillery, cannon and 
Figure 1. Damage assessment summary.
Damage Assessment Summary





North Gaza 1,253 761 1,000 3,014 1,702
Gaza City 1,963 1,127 1,378 4,468 1,765
Deir Al Balah 809 406 683 1,898 553
Khan Younis 1,749 898 1,379 4,026 1,549
Rafah 987 373 498 1,858 1,604
Total 6,761 3,565 4,938 16,264 7,473
Extent of ERW damage in the residential area in Beit Lahiya, Gaza.
All graphics courtesy of UNMAS.
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recoilless projectiles, mortar bombs, grenades, and rockets 
all exist. In addition, there is the threat from air delivered 
ordnance of up to 2,000 lb (907 kg) bombs and the toxico-
logical hazard associated with fired-depleted uranium, armor- 
piercing projectiles.
UNMAS Gaza Emergency Response 
On 27 July 2014, in response to a directive from the U.N. 
Secretary General, the United Nations Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS) deployed three explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
technical advisors to work directly with the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and 
other U.N. agencies. The UNMAS team was based 
in the UNRWA compound during the conflict and 
was responsible for carrying out ERW risk assess-
ments at U.N. facilities and other structures. This 
was to ensure that U.N. personnel and civilians 
seeking refuge in U.N. premises were safe from 
ERW and other explosive hazards. During the 
emergency response, UNMAS Gaza carried out 
214 ERW risk assessments on facilities of which 
209 were cleared and five were handed back to the 
parent organization to be included within the re-
construction phase. As a result, UNRWA was in a 
position to reopen all schools on their scheduled 
date, thereby enabling 240,000 children to resume 
their academic curriculum in a safe environment 
free from ERW. The UNMAS emergency response 
phase was critical to address immediate ERW and 
other explosive threats to the U.N., as well as re-
sponding to the critical humanitarian needs of the 
general civilian population.
This deployment was vital in facilitating an 
ERW response during the early stages of the con-
f lict. The immediate ERW threats to the civil-
ian population were addressed and requirements 
for a long-term ERW response were determined 
through a defined needs assessment. The assess-
ment included the identification and analysis of 
the ERW threat, identifying those affected by the 
threat, as well as the extent and measurable ef-
fects caused by the threat. The approach was “bot-
tom-up” whereby all community stakeholders and 
beneficiaries were consulted prior to any program 
development, thereby identifying potential barri-
ers early. The results of the needs assessment were 
formalized within the UNMAS Gaza concept of 
operations (CONOPS).
Overview of ERW Risk Assessment 
Generic risk assessment is a multi-disciplinary approach 
used by many organizations and industries for hazard identi-
fication, accident prevention and mitigation. It consists of an 
objective evaluation of hazards and risks in which supposi-
tions and fears are measured, analyzed and presented so that 
a decision can be made concerning a course of action.
Within the context of the UNMAS Gaza emergency re-
sponse, a hazard was defined as any item of ERW that could 
 UNRWA classroom in Biet Hanoon.
Destroyed residential area of Shejaayea.
Removal of a neutralized 2000 lb bomb at the Rafah border crossing.
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cause harm, whereas a risk was defined as the chance that 
somebody could be harmed by an ERW hazard. Therefore 
the ERW risk assessment was an invaluable process that de-
termined how the ERW hazards were defined and how they 
affected planning and operations. A conscious decision was 
made to ensure that the processes should always work toward 
producing useful information that can be assimilated practi-
cally into all levels of operations. The ERW risk assessment 
was a systematic and investigative process that involved iden-
tifying hazards, predicting possible incidents, and determin-
ing the impact of hazards and mitigation measures that can be 
implemented or planned.
Principles of ERW Risk Assessment 
The ERW risk assessments were conducted in a con-
stantly changing environment due to the f luid nature of the 
conf lict in Gaza. From an operational management per-
spective, the following core principles guided our principle- 
based approach: 
• The protection of human life—conducting ERW risk as-
sessments inevitably exposed individuals to a high level 
of risk; therefore, all exposure was preemptive and de-
liberate where possible, with all mitigation measures in 
place. 
• The adoption of a holistic view—ensuring that the ERW 
risk assessments were viewed as an integrated system 
with several interconnecting components, all of which 
needed to be analyzed in order to determine the threat 
or hazard. 
• The adoption of an investigative mindset—knowing the 
mission, method and means of the conflict often revealed 
the most probable type and extent of ERW contamina-
tion likely to be encountered. However, the importance 
of remaining open-minded was emphasized, as it can 
lessen the risks of making premature decisions and de-
veloping personal biases. 
• The dissemination of detailed and practical find-
ings ensured that mitigation measures could be ef-
fectively implemented and monitored with minimal 
disruption. 
Phases of ERW Risk Assessment 
In order to develop a comprehensive, reliable and consis-
tent ERW risk assessment system, the following six-phased 
approach was adopted for all ERW risk assessment activities, 
regardless of requesting agency or facility type: 
• Task planning 
• Risk assessment 
• Information analysis 
• Report production 
• Information dissemination 
• Process evaluation 
The phases flow in a continuous cycle creating a system 
that is self-improving and adaptable to most situations.
ERW Risk Assessment Methodology 
Conducting ERW risk assessments within the context of 
the Gaza armed conflict, whether during the conflict or im-
mediately after the cessation of hostilities, was challenging 
due to the specific facets that had to be considered. These fac-
ets included security, access, logistics, neutrality, and access 
to locations and information sources. Particularly challeng-
ing during the ERW risk assessments was the ever-changing 
security situation that could change from a workable, condu-
cive environment to one of heightened danger in a short peri-
od of time. In an attempt to mitigate the security threat whilst 
conducting ERW risk assessments, a very specific security risk 
management plan through an ERW Security CONOPS was 
defined and implemented with the UNRWA field security of-
fice (FSO), which included:
• Casualty Evacuation procedures 
• Contingency plans 
• Coordination mechanisms 
• Escort arrangements 
• Identification of safe havens 
• Route assessment and planning 
• Security measures
• Security risk assessment matrix
As the purpose of the ERW risk assessment was to iden-
tify hazards and risks, this methodology was chosen through 
a fact-building questionnaire within an ERW risk assessment 
report. This methodology was chosen because it provides a 
systematic way of evaluating situations, ascertaining threats, 
collecting and analyzing information, and reporting pertinent 
facts and results to the client. 
On completion of the ERW risk assessment report, all de-
tails were forwarded to the requesting agency along with de-
tails of any recommended risk-mitigation measures.
ERW Risk Assessment Results Analysis
The following section is an analysis of the collat-
ed ERW risk assessment resulting from the 214 facili-
ties visited. The actual analysis was a two-stage process 
where the data was identified and organized into the pre- 
selected tables and then interpreted to gain a better un-
derstanding of the facts.
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Requesting Agency Type 
The following summarizes which agencies requested 
ERW risk assessments: 
• A total number of 214 ERW risk assessment requests 
were received and completed giving a 100 percent re-
sponse rate. 
• U.N. agencies accounted for 99 percent of the ERW risk 
assessment requests, with the majority of ERW risk as-
sessment requests originating from UNRWA (146), fol-
lowed by UNICEF (26); United Nations Development 
Programme (15); and United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (14). 
• Educational facilities comprised 65 percent of the 
ERW risk assessment requests, while medical facilities 
comprised 10 percent. 
• Although it was openly stated during all humanitarian 
meetings attended by UNMAS Gaza during the emer-
gency response phase that UNMAS was available to 
help, UNMAS received only one request for an ERW 
risk assessment from an NGO. 
• A relatively low number of UNICEF-supported 
schools were assessed by UNMAS Gaza because the 
Civil Protection Police (CPP) EOD teams conducted the 
majority of ERW risk assessments at the request of the 
Ministry of Education.
ERW Designation Type
A total number of 381 items of ERW (or component 
parts) were located and cleared with the assistance of the 
CPP EOD teams. 
• The highest proportion of ERW type cleared was the 105 
mm and 120 mm high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) mu-
nitions, with 59 percent recorded. This ammunition is 
associated with the two main variants of the Merkeva 
main battle tank. These HEAT munitions were alleg-
edly used to reduce collateral damage, as the munitions 
contain directional charges (as opposed to being omni- 
directional) and have considerably less explosives.6 
• For 60 percent of the 93 assessments where 155 mm il-
luminating artillery ammunition was cleared, the muni-
tion consisted of an empty illuminating projectile casing. 
















Requests 100 12 34 15 26 3 9 14 1 214
ERW RA
Completions 100 12 34 15 26 3 9 14 1 214


















Mine Grenade Guided Missiles Total
UNRWA 
Schools 100 0 30 0 32 6 41 0 0 1 7 117
UNRWA 
Clinics 12 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 6
UNRWA 
Other 34 1 3 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 9
UNDP 15 5 10 0 20 1 11 5 0 0 0 52
UNICEF 
Schools 26 9 37 0 68 13 5 0 1 0 0 133
UNSCO 3 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
WHO 
Hospitals 9 0 1 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
UNESCO 
Education 14 7 0 0 23 0 10 0 0 0 1 41
NGO 
Education 1 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Total 214 22 93 5 153 20 73 5 1 1 8 381
Figure 3. ERW designation types.
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sustained to many facilities due to the free falling casings, 
including one that entered the roof and exited the floor 
pan of a U.N. Special Coordinator’s Office (UNSCO) B6 
armored land-cruiser.
• In all assessments of guided missile use, the component 
parts recovered were thought to be those of Hellfire guid-
ed missiles. 
• The only recorded use of a mine was an M-15 anti-tank 
mine that was used as a demolition charge to destroy a 
mosque adjacent to a Palestine Authority (PA) school; 
the mine only partially detonated with the remnants be-
ing thrown into the school grounds. 
• All aerial bomb component parts matched that of the 
MK-80 series, low-drag, general-purpose aerial bomb. 
• The only hand grenade recovered was an M26 hand gre-
nade that was cleared following a family dispute at an 
UNRWA school, which was being used as a camp for in-
ternally displaced persons. 
• All ERW items cleared, with the exception of the hand 
grenade and 120 mm mortars, originated from the IDF 
or the Israeli Air Force (IAF).
Structural Damage 
Figure 4 provides analysis on the sustained structural 
damage: 
• Of all facilities that were assessed, 70 percent received 
some degree of structural damage whether through di-
rect fire or indirect fire, with 30 percent receiving no 
structural damage.7,8 
• There was a higher proportion of ERW risk assessed fa-
cilities that received structural damage through indirect 
fire (53 percent) than direct fire (47 percent). 
• Of the UNESCO facilities that were assessed, 92 per-
cent were found to have sustained structural damage 
from either direct fire or indirect fire, with 73 percent of 
UNICEF-supported PA schools having sustained some 
level of damage. 
• The damage ranged from Small Arms Ammunition 
(SAA) impact strikes to the total destruction of buildings 
and facilities by the use of aerial bombs. 
• In addition to damage sustained from direct fire or indi-
rect fire, some facilities also had direct damage from IAF 
armored bulldozers; this is especially the case for facili-
ties located to the east of the Salah Ed Deen main arte-
rial route. 
• The one NGO facility, a children’s nursery, was complete-
ly destroyed by tank projectiles, artillery projectiles, aer-
ial bombs and armored bulldozers.
Evidence of Military Occupation 
Evidence of military occupation is presented in the follow-
ing narrative and in Figure 5: 
• Only eight percent of ERW risk assessments saw evidence 
of any military occupation. 
• This eight percent was only evident in UNRWA Schools 
and UNICEF-supported school facilities. 
Aerial Bomb Clearance 
• During the UNMAS Gaza emergency response, a total of 
118 aerial bombs were destroyed with 16 neutralized by 
UNMAS Gaza prior to final disposal by detonation. The 
Ministry of Interior realized that not all EOD tasks can 
be undertaken by the CPP EOD teams due to limitations 
in their technical knowledge base and therefore request-
ed UNMAS to render-safe the bomb fuzes. 
• Conducting major EOD clearance- tasks within the 
post-conflict Gaza environment was and still is ex-
tremely complex due to the differing interlocutors that 
must be considered and consulted. It is of paramount 
Agency RA’s Direct Fire
Indirect
 Fire Total
UNRWA Schools 100 25 42 67
UNRWA Clinics 12 1 7 8
UNRWA Other 34 13 14 27
UNDP 15 6 2 8
UNICEF Schools 26 13 6 19
UNSCO 3 1 0 1
WHO Hospitals 9 2 4 6
UNESCO Education 14 8 5 13
NGO Education 1 1 0 1
Total 214 70 80 150
Figure 4. Structural damage analysis.
Agency RA’s IDF Armed Groups Total
UNRWA Schools 100 4 7 11
UNRWA Clinics 12 0 0 0
UNRWA Other 34 0 0 0
UNDP 15 0 0 0
UNICEF Schools 26 5 0 5
UNSCO 3 0 0 0
WHO Hospitals 9 0 0 0
UNESCO Education 14 0 0 0
NGO Education 1 0 0 0
Total 214 9 7 16
Figure 5. Evidence of military occupation.
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importance that for any major EOD operation, prior ap-
proval must be gained from the Ministry of Interior, the 
UNRWA director and the UNMAS director, and all rel-
evant information must be presented to the Coordinator 
of Government Activities in the Territories Unit in the 
Coordination and Liaison Administration for Gaza.
Aerial Bomb and Fuze Technical Analysis 
A technical analysis on the 16 aerial bombs rendered safe 
including the following:
• All of the aerial bombs and 67 percent of the fuzes were of 
NATO origin and manufacture.
• Small diameter bombs accounted for 31 percent of the 
aerial bombs rendered safe; low drag general purpose 
bombs accounted for the remaining 69 percent. 
• The 1000 lb aerial bomb was the most common aerial 
bomb type rendered safe, accounting for 43 percent of 
aerial bombs. 
• An electronic multi-functioning aerial bomb fuze was 
the most common fuze type rendered safe, accounting 
for 38 percent of aerial bombs. 
• During the render-safe operation, stuck-fast fuzes oc-
curred in 25 percent of cases. With these aerial bombs, 
there was a medium degree of bomb body deformation 
through the initial impact with the target. This would 
have caused movement of the internal components with-
in the aerial bomb, potentially leading to misfires and 31 
percent of the aerial bomb fuzes had armed and partially 
functioned, but the detonating wave was not transferred 
into the booster element. 
• In aerial bombs where both nose and tail fuzes could be 
fitted, only tail fuzes were used with inert aerodynamic 
plugs fitted in the nose cavity.
Summary 
Ensuring the safety of staff during operations was of par-
amount importance and required that UNMAS Gaza effec-
tively manage the ever-changing security situation through 
the creation and implementation of a specific security risk 
management system. This was only possible through the close 
coordination and facilitation of the UNRWA FSO, who was 
fundamental in the management of the security enabling en-
vironment. 
Conducting ERW risk assessments was and is a sensitive 
and delicate process, as it deals with how hazards and risks are 
perceived and managed. In order to eliminate any personal 
bias during the ERW risk assessment procedure, it was vital 
that a formal and systematic ERW risk assessment procedure 
was agreed upon, documented, applied and reviewed. The de-
fined ERW risk assessment methodology has been modified 
to suit the specific nuances of other ERW risk assessments 
within a phased response. Initially, the ERW risk assessment 
procedure was defined for the UNMAS emergency response 
phase and now has been modified for the UNMAS ERW re-
construction support phase.
The analysis of the ERW risk assessments from the 214 fa-
cilities visited was based on a relatively small sample num-
ber when looking at the quantities of explosive ordnance used 
and the damage and destruction within the wider context of 
the 2014 conflict. While in-depth, valid information was ob-
tained, it should not be viewed as an exact representation of 
the situation Gaza-wide. 
It should be noted that when managing the recovered data, 
a conscious effort was made to present “real impartial data” 
as opposed to unsubstantiated anecdotes. The data was sim-
ply presented in an unbiased manner with the intention of de-
termining useful information and formulating conclusions to 
assist in the technical decision making process.
Collectively, the UNMAS emergency response findings 
and the results from the ERW response needs assessment pro-
vided the prerequisite information needed to accurately de-
fine the future UNMAS Gaza CONOPS. This has and will 
continue to ensure that appropriate technical assets and sup-
port mechanisms are in place for each operational phase, 
thereby ensuring that UNMAS continues to meet and exceed 
the expectations of all stakeholders involved. 
See endnotes page 66
Mark Frankish
Ammunition & Weapon Management Advisor
UNMAS Gaza
1 United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017 /  USA
Website: www.mineaction.org
Mark Frankish is a former British 
army bomb disposal officer who 
has worked in ERW and mine action 
since 1998 for The HALO Trust, 
UNMAS and within the Gas and Oil 
Sectors (Shell & Exxon Mobil). He 
joined UNMAS in 2001 in Kosovo and 
worked in numerous projects at both 
an operational and program management level until 
2010. Since 2010, he has continued working within the 
humanitarian and commercial sectors, and most recently 
he was the ammunition and weapons management 
advisor for UNMAS during the Gaza Emergency Response 
2014 – 2015. He has a MA in post conflict reconstruction 
and development from the University of York (U.K.).
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